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FOREWORD 
ORGANS AND INDUCEMENTS 
PHILIP J. COOK*  
KIMBERLY D. KRAWIEC** 
The Organs and Inducements symposium originated from two 
developments: (1) the large and growing gap between kidney supply and need 
for people with end-stage renal disease and (2) the failure of recent policy and 
medical innovations to reverse that trend. The gap between kidney need and 
supply became visible after the United Network for Organ Sharing data system 
first went online in 1995 and has been growing ever since.1 Over the next decade 
through 2006, transplants increased but the number of patients in need of 
kidneys grew faster than the supply of kidneys available for transplantation. 
Since 2006 the need for kidneys has continued to increase, albeit slowly, but the 
number of suitable kidneys available for transplantation has plateaued, 
resulting in a still-further widening of the gap.2 
Today, over 7500 patients with end-stage renal disease die each year while 
awaiting a transplant or become too sick to transplant, while many more 
languish on the kidney waiting list, which passed 100,000 persons for the first 
time this year.3 Although recent advances in kidney transplantation, such as 
kidney paired donation and nonsimultaneous, extended, altruistic donor 
(NEAD) chains hold great promise, the number of transplants performed using 
such techniques remains small and has failed to stem the trend of unmet need.4 
Most of those on the waiting list are on dialysis, a costly and time-consuming 
procedure that is far less satisfactory than transplantation in sustaining either 
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 1.  Philip J. Cook & Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Primer on Kidney Transplantation: Anatomy of the 
Shortage, 77 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014 at 12 (Figure 2). 
 2.  Id.  
 3. Id. at 10 (Table 1, showing the number of deaths, too sick to transplant, and other waitlist 
removals for 2011); Data, ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/converge/latestData/rptData.asp  (last visited Oct. 7, 2014). 
 4.  Living Donor Transplants By Donor Relation, U.S. Transplants Performed: January 1, 1988-
July 31, 2014, ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/converge/latestData/rptData.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2014) (For Organ 
= Kidney, choose category “transplant,” choose organ “kidney,” choose report “living donor 
transplants by donor relation.”). 
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the quality or duration of life for renal patients.5 
From one perspective, this great loss of life is tragic in that it is foreseeable 
but unnecessary. Recent evidence suggests that if kidney donors were offered a 
reasonable payment, enough of them could be recruited to close the current 
gap, thereby saving thousands of lives and reducing the overall public 
expenditures on renal disease.6 From another perspective, paying someone to 
donate a body part is immoral per se, even if the medical consequences to the 
donor are minimal and the choice to donate is deliberate and carefully 
administered. This latter view is incorporated in current law in the United 
States and all but a handful of other nations in the world.7 
We convened an interdisciplinary discussion at Duke University in the 
spring of 2013 to discuss these issues, with a particular focus on potential next 
steps in the long-running debate about methods to increase the supply of 
transplantable organs. We purposely employed the term “inducements” rather 
than “incentives,” believing that the term “incentives” had become too closely 
tied with organ markets in the traditional sense—compensation for organs with 
money, vouchers, or some close cousin. 
In contrast, we viewed the phrase “inducement” as potentially signifying 
something broader and more inclusive. According to Merriam-Webster, an 
inducement is simply “a motive or consideration that leads one to action.”8 We 
thus invited discussion and investigation, not only of proposals to increase 
organ supply that involved offering donors monetary or similar compensation, 
but also more subtle means to facilitate and encourage organ donation. 
From our perspective, then, inducements could range from public-awareness 
campaigns exhorting people to donate and informing them of the severity of the 
organ shortage at one end of the spectrum to outright organ-auction markets at 
the other end of the spectrum. But we largely expected authors to address the 
many interesting variations on potential inducement schemes in between those 
two extremes, and that is what our participants did.  
The Kidney Transplantation Primer by Philip J. Cook and Kimberly D. 
Krawiec sets the stage for the discussion by quantitatively documenting the 
growing gap between kidney need and supply. Cook and Krawiec demonstrate 
that the current system provides only about half as many kidneys as are needed 
for transplantation. The gap cannot be eliminated through an increase in 
deceased donation alone, because most kidneys from suitable deceased donors 
are already procured. Moreover, the prospects for increasing living donations 
 
 5.  Cook & Krawiec, supra note 1, at 3–9.  
 6.  Id. at 7–12. 
 7.  Only one country, Iran, permits cash payments for living kidney donation. Other countries, 
including (in some jurisdictions) the United States, permit other incentives, including tax credits and 
paid work leaves.  Finally, a handful of countries, such as Spain, permit incentives for deceased 
donation, such as funeral benefits. See generally, T. Randolph Beard & Jim Leitzel, Designing A 
Compensated–Kidney Donation System, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2014 at 253. 
 8.  Inducement.—Definition and More from the Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/inducement (last visited Nov. 10, 2014). 
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under the current system are dim. Donations from living kidney donors have 
declined from their 2004 peak and nearly all living kidney donations are 
directed, usually to family members, rendering the current account of living 
kidney donation as “altruistic” somewhat misleading. 
Cook and Krawiec conclude that the time is ripe to reconsider financial 
incentives for kidney donation. Though such a system could produce unsavory 
consequences if not carefully designed and managed, the most likely version of 
the future in its absence is a continuation of unnecessarily high rates of death 
and disability from kidney failure. 
I 
THE ETHICAL DILEMMA 
Although most of our symposium authors make clear that they are intrigued 
by or overtly supportive of modifying the current ban on financial inducements 
to encourage kidney donation, Alexander Capron is the exception. His paper, 
Six Decades Of Organ Donation And The Challenges That Shifting The United 
States To A Market System Would Create Around The World, provides the 
historical and international context for the impressive current consensus against 
paying for organs—of all the nations of the world, only Iran has established a 
system of payments for organs. The global ban well represents the 
anticommercialization principles adopted by the World Health Assemblies in 
1991 and 2010 and the advocacy of leaders in the field of transplant medicine. 
Capron makes the case that this consensus should be respected and serve as a 
brake on calls for reform. His paper also reviews the ethical arguments for the 
status quo, including the possibility that donations motivated by financial gain 
would mainly attract poor and financially desperate donors who ultimately 
would likely be made worse off by the transaction. This judgment rests on a 
rejection of the liberal belief in free choice by autonomous adults as a reliable 
guide to self-interest or the public interest. The collective result of introducing 
financial inducements, Capron suggests, may be to exacerbate existing 
inequities. And even if there is a case for liberalizing the system in the United 
States, Capron argues, we should consider the effect such a reform would have 
on low- and middle-income countries, some of which have struggled to police 
the underground market for kidneys that has exploited their more 
impoverished residents and led to many abuses. 
In his first of two contributions to the symposium, Regulating The Organ 
Market, I. Glenn Cohen also spells out the arguments against financial 
inducements, but with a different purpose. His goal is to provide a logical 
framework for the policy debate, one that relates each concern to a particular 
sort of regulation. For example, ethicists often express a concern that, even if 
consensual, organ sales may wrongfully exploit potential donors. This concern, 
however, can normally be addressed through price floors that ensure the donor 
is adequately compensated. Cohen presents a typology of concerns, a typology 
of regulations, and a logical mapping between the two, so that a policy analyst 
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could conclude that if a particular concern is deemed valid and important, the 
regulatory implication is clear. Cohen admits, however, that such rational 
analysis does not always carry the day in this contentious area. 
The next two papers further develop this ethical terrain by sampling public 
views on organ transplantation. In the first of these contributions, Perceptions 
Of Efficacy, Morality, And Politics Of Potential Cadaveric Organ-
Transplantation Reforms, Christopher T. Robertson, David V. Yokum, and 
Megan S. Wright report the results of a survey of 730 individuals from an online 
population who were asked to evaluate six possible regulatory reforms designed 
to encourage deceased donations of organs. Respondents were asked to judge 
each alternative on three dimensions: likely effectiveness in encouraging 
donation (“efficacy”), the morality of that reform, and overall preference. 
Interestingly the creation of a regulated market in organs was rejected by most 
respondents, although viewed as effective in securing an increase in organs for 
transplantation; on the other hand, offering a voucher to cover funeral expenses 
was viewed as much more acceptable. Other reforms, including an “opt-out” 
rule in becoming a donor (i.e., people who fail to state whether they wish to 
donate their organs following death are presumed to be donors), were generally 
acceptable alone or in combination. The article excerpts written comments 
provided by several respondents, and these further illuminate the complexity of 
preferences in this domain. 
In a similar vein, the contribution by Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth 
assesses some dimensions of public opinion about organ donation, but in 
contrast to Robertson, Yokum, and Wright, focuses on inducements for living 
kidney donation and, in particular, a donation that is not directed to a particular 
recipient. Undirected living donations are rare in the current regime, amounting 
to fewer than 200 per year. The survey provides a brief introduction and then 
asks respondents to indicate their view (on a ten-point scale) of awarding such 
donors a $50,000 “heroism” prize. Different versions of the prize program are 
described (according to whether the prize is awarded to all donors or just a few, 
and according to whether it is financed by the federal government or a private 
foundation). Although all receive majority support from the sample of 
respondents, there was one strong result—the least popular program was to 
have the federal government award $50,000 to each and every donor at the 
expense of taxpayers. 
II 
INNOVATIONS FOR EXPANDING SUPPLY 
The second half of the symposium focuses on specific proposals for reform, 
and includes seven papers that consider the forms that inducements might take 
and with what consequences. The first two papers in this group consider the 
possibilities of American policy reform in a global context. First, in their paper 
Reverse Transplant Tourism, Kimberly D. Krawiec and Michael A. Rees offer a 
design for an expanded program of kidney paired donation. They consider the 
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case of an American with kidney failure with a volunteer American donor who 
is not compatible in terms of blood type. This pair could conceivably be 
matched with a foreign patient–donor pair and arrange a swap. The innovation 
here is that the foreign pair need not be incompatible with each other to make 
this an attractive proposition for them—if, for example, their agreement were 
predicated on American funding for the necessary immunosuppressive drugs 
that would otherwise not be affordable. Krawiec and Rees note that this 
arrangement could bring in foreign easy-to-match recipients and O–blood type 
donors, who are compatible with all blood types (and hence are 
underrepresented in the kidney-swap donor pool). They argue that the payment 
for the foreign recipient’s drugs would not be a violation of the National Organ 
Transplant Act (NOTA), and that this arrangement would not be exploitative 
of the foreign patient’s poverty, since he or she would receive both a kidney and 
the lifesaving drugs necessary to avoid rejection, while the foreign donor would 
perhaps benefit by having his kidney removed in an American hospital. 
The second paper with a global perspective, I. Glenn Cohen’s Organs 
Without Borders?, focuses on two questions: First, should the United States 
allow “foreigners” on the transplantation waiting list for kidneys, and second, 
should the United States participate in a kidney distribution network that 
includes other countries? Current policy regarding the first issue may come as a 
surprise—in fact, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network 
(OPTN) does allow foreigners on the waiting list, typically those who are 
wealthy enough to pay the full cost of the transplantation. Cohen concludes, 
based on a careful review of the arguments, that OPTN should reconsider this 
policy—there is no compelling reason why Americans should be deprived of 
American kidneys that are of suitable quality. On the other hand, Cohen argues 
that the United States should join multinational organ-allocation systems where 
there is an expectation of reciprocity. 
The next two papers get to the heart of the “inducements” debate by 
providing carefully considered arguments in support of paying kidney donors. 
In their paper State Organ-Donation Incentives Under The National Organ 
Transplant Act, Sally Satel, Joshua C. Morrison, and Rick K. Jones begin by 
dubbing the current kidney transplant regime a “qualified failure” because 
supply falls so far short of need. They argue that, contrary to the established 
interpretation, NOTA does not impose a complete ban on benefits to donors by 
its proscription of “valuable consideration.” In fact, they say, the proper 
interpretation of this federal law leaves open the development of state 
programs that provide donors with a financial benefit under rules that would 
prevent the transaction from appearing “clearly and definitely commercial.” 
Since their interpretation of the current law is not widely accepted, and the 
states are unwilling to move forward in this way without greater assurance, the 
authors advocate clarification of the law through either a Justice Department 
legal opinion or an amendment to NOTA that specifically authorizes state-
benefit programs. One result, they say, is that “the laboratory of the states” 
could generate much-needed information on how a benefits program of that 
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sort would function in practice. 
In the second paper of this pair, Designing A Compensated-Kidney 
Donation System, economists T. Randolph Beard and Jim Leitzel develop a 
fairly detailed proposal for a financial incentive system that would stimulate 
both deceased and living donations. The image they offer is of the kidney donor 
as “hero,” who like police, firefighters, and military personnel provides a vital 
public service at some risk to themselves. They note that we honor those who 
serve in these capacities, despite the fact that they volunteer for this duty and 
are paid. In the authors’ scheme, there would be no market, but rather a 
government-funded agency responsible for procuring kidneys from carefully 
vetted donors. The kidneys would be distributed to transplant recipients 
according to priority established by medical need, as is in the current regime. 
The main change would be that that agency would be in a position to offer 
substantial financial compensation to donors. 
The current regime for soliciting kidney donors is often characterized as 
based on “altruism”—donors do not receive a tangible reward or, for that 
matter, much public recognition, and are motivated to take on this sacrifice out 
of concern for others. In particular, the motivation is to provide the gift of 
better health and longer life to someone suffering from kidney failure. (In the 
case of living donors, the recipient is almost always designated by the donor and 
is usually a family member of close friend, so the motivation is personal.) In 
their paper Altruism Exchanges And The Kidney Shortage, Stephen J. Choi, 
Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner propose a reform that would expand on the 
charitable impulse that motivates donors. The “exchange” in their plan would 
provide donors not only with the satisfaction of saving a life, but also with the 
satisfaction of contributing to some other good cause. That contribution, a 
contractual quid pro quo specified by the donor, could be made by the kidney 
recipient or friends of the recipient or even by a foundation created for this 
purpose, and made in kind or in cash. The authors argue that, because in their 
altruism exchange scheme (like the current regime), the donor’s reward would 
be in the form of a good deed done, it should not engender ethical concerns 
associated with a market for kidneys, including the commodification of the 
body and exploitation of the poor. 
In their article Reciprocal Altruism, Jacob Lavee and Avraham Stoler tell 
the interesting story of reforms adopted by Israel in 2008 that were designed to 
increase organ donation by enhancing the charitable “payoff.” (Dr. Lavee gets 
much of the credit for leading the reform effort.) Under the new law, Israelis 
were first effectively blocked from seeking out deceased or living organ donors 
in any country in which organ donation does not comply with the principles set 
forward by the Declaration of Istanbul (such as China or the Philippines), 
through a practice known as “transplant tourism,” thus increasing the perceived 
(and actual) need for Israeli donations. Further, this reform sought to enhance 
the perceived fairness of the organ allocation system by providing priority on 
the waiting list to living donors and those who had agreed to donate following 
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death. The authors note that this arrangement is a sort of “reciprocal altruism.” 
At the same time, the reform removed disincentives of living donation by 
ensuring various life insurance reimbursements as well as forty days of lost 
wages. Although the reforms have not been in place long, there is some 
indication of success. 
The final article, Organ Quality As A Complicating Factor In Proposed 
Systems Of Inducements For Organ Donation by Michael L. Volk, raises an 
issue that has been largely ignored in the discussion of inducements. Kidneys 
that are potentially available for transplantation are not all equal, and in 
particular differ in the risk that they are infected and, more likely, that they will 
fail following transplantation. Unsuitable donors are routinely screened out 
under the current system, of course, but those that are deemed suitable are 
quite heterogeneous. In effect, even of those that are suitable, some are worth 
more than others. That fact raises the troubling question of whether a reform 
that provided financial incentives to donors should adjust the payment to the 
perceived quality of the kidney. A related problem is that donors may be 
incentivized to lie about matters relevant to determining whether their kidneys 
are likely to carry infection (such as HIV). Volk notes that the ultimate goal of 
any reform is not to increase the number of donors, but to increase the number 
of successful transplants. 
III 
CONCLUSION 
This October marked thirty years since NOTA’s passage. On the statute’s 
anniversary, the kidney waiting list stood at over 100,000. Though NOTA’s ban 
against valuable consideration generated little discussion at the time of passage, 
that is no longer the case. Today, academics, transplant professionals, patient 
advocates, living organ donors, and others routinely call for clarifications, 
reforms, or repeal of the ban against valuable consideration, while others warn 
that the dire need for transplantable organs should not overshadow the 
concerns that prompted the kidney market prohibition in the first place. As the 
contributions to this volume suggest, there is no lack of creative ideas for new 
mechanisms that would induce donations with little damage to the ethical 
principles that are embodied in NOTA. 
 
